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thus overcome the otherwise harsh effect of the statute of limitations.8 '
These results are clearly justifiable, because in circumstances where
no prejudice to a defendant is evident, the statute of limitations is
satisfied by sufficient notice in the original pleading.
ARTICLE 3 -

JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE

AN CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 303: Court declares personal delivery to be the only acceptable
method of service.
Pursuant to CPLR 303, the commencement of an action in New
York by one who is not himself subject to personal jurisdiction in the
state is an automatic designation of his attorney in the action, during
its pendency, as his agent for service of process. 8 2 The section also
contains a provision to the effect that service upon such an agent is
deemed to be service upon his principal only in any other action in
which the principal is a defendant and a party to the principal's original action is a plaintiff if the subsequent action, had it been brought
in the supreme court, would have been permitted as a counterclaim.8 3
However, the statute does not indicate what manner of service must
be employed. In Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dupper,4 the
first department, in a per curiam opinion, recently held that since
the statute is silent on this point, only personal delivery will suffice;
substituted service, apparently employed in Twentieth Century-Fox,
will be deemed void.
Pre-CPLR case law would seem to support the court's conclusion.
81s ee, e.g., Ringle v. Bass, 46 Misc. 2d 896, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. Ulster
County 1965); Berlin v. Goldberg, 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 266 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1966).
Where a defendant has notice of an action for personal injuries arising from an automobile collision and is thereby apprised of possible liability for property damage, there
is no reason to allow the statute to continue running. In such an instance it is appropriate to apply the principle of laches; and, where no prejudice is shown, the amendment
is proper. 1 W. K. & M.
203.30.
82 Although it would seem that the section cannot be employed where the defendant
is, in fact, subject to personal jurisdiction when his agent is served, a federal district
court has held that no attempt at service upon the defendant is necessary in the first
instance. Miller v. Massa, 237 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The resultant agency relationship begins with the service of process and terminates
with entry of the final judgment in the action commenced by that service. Concourse
Super Serv. Station, Inc. v. Price, 33 Misc. 2d 503, 226 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1962). Similar statutory schemes have been upheld as a proper exercise of the
state's jurisdiction. E.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938).
83 It has been recognized that this provision is expansive rather than restrictive, as
it permits the plaintiff to bring his action without being bound by jurisdictional monetary limits in the court in which the first action was brought. I W. K. & M.
303.07.
84 33 App. Div. 2d 682, 305 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Ist Dep't 1969).
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For example, in Cirigliano v. Brown 85 a requirement of notice in a
rent regulation statute governing holdover proceedings was held to
mean notice by personal service in the absence of specific legislative
authorization sanctioning a different mode of service. And, in Stevens
v. State,8 6 the case relied upon by the Twentieth Century-Fox court,
this principle was recognized in a secondary holding by the appellate
division. Stevens dealt with service of a judgment with notice of entry
upon an adverse party's attorney, and under the CPA8 7 and RCP 8
service by mail was held to be invalid; of course, the same would be
true today under the CPLR which perpetuates the dichotomy between
initiatory process and interlocutory papers.89
Even though the result arrived at in Twentieth Century-Fox is
undoubtedly correct, the court's declaration that personal delivery is
the only acceptable method of service upon a 303 agent is questionable in view of the alternatives presented by CPLR 308. In the latter
section the legislature provided methods for effecting personal service
upon "the person to be served." This phrase was adopted in lieu of
the CPA language

-

"to the defendant in person" 90 -

in recognition

of CPLR provisions permitting service upon persons other than the
defendant. 91 Because of CPLR 308's expanded concept of personal
service, it should no longer be equated with personal delivery, and it
seems clear that personal delivery is now merely one of the ways to
effect personal service. In short, CPLR 308 designates how service may
be made, and not who may be served. Thus, the 308(3) "nail and mail"
method of service should be available for serving a 303 agent if the
server has fulfilled the due diligence requirement 92 contained in 308
(1). Moreover, 308(4), which enables a plaintiff to move for a court
order authorizing substituted service, should also be a valid mode of
service upon a 303 agent when service under either 308(1) or 308(3)
is impracticable. Indeed, in view of the scope of the CPLR, the modes
of service made available by 308 should be useful in any statutory
85 185 Misc. 829, 57 N.Y.S.2d 113 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 5th Dist. 1945).
86 277 App. Div. 418, 100 N.Y.S.2d 826 (3d Dep't 1950); see also Duckworth v. Duckworth, 200 Misc. 10, 105 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951).
87 CPA 225.

88 RCP 20.
89 Compare CPLR 307-315 and CPLR 403(c) & (d) with CPLR 2103.
90 CPA 225(3). See CPA 280 & 231.

91See CPLR 803, 811, & 318; 1 W. K. & M.
808.11 and 308.15.
92 See Blatz v. Benschine, 58 Misc. 2d 352, 278 N.YS.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1967). One notable treatise is in accord with the Twentieth Century-Fox court's holding
that personal delivery is the proper method when service is directed without specifying
the method. See 2A W. K. & M.
2108.04.
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scheme which requires notice but which fails to designate the method
3
of service to be employed.
As indicated previously, however, the plaintiff in Twentieth Century-Fox would not have fared any better under this construction
of the statute since he had not complied with CPLR 308 to any degree.
And, the courts have repeatedly held that substituted service cannot
be utilized without express statutory authority or court permission. 4
Nevertheless, a valid argument can be made that the rules for service
upon a 803 agent should be more relaxed than the other rules governing service of initiatory process, and that service upon such an
agent should be valid if the summons and complaint are mailed to,
or left at, his office. This follows from the very character of CPLR
303: the section can only be utilized when a defendant in the first
action wishes to bring a cause of action in the nature of a counterclaim against the party who commenced that action. 95 Counterclaims
are interposed by an answer, 96 and it is always permissible to serve
answers upon the plaintiff's attorney by personal delivery, mail, or
by leaving it at his office.9T Thus, the requirement for personal service
of process upon a 308 agent could be viewed as comparatively restrictive. Justification for this distinction might lie in the fact that after
service is made in an action an attorney anticipates receipt of certain
papers relating thereto, and this would not be true of a summons
commencing an independent action against his client. However, motions papers are not always anticipated, and they may be served by
mail.9 8 Therefore, perhaps the solution in such a case is to permit a
more liberal method of service while also liberalizing the ability to
vacate a default judgment if the defendant can make a satisfactory
showing that he has not received the summons and had no notice of
the action.
In any event, the courts and practitioners should realize the utility of CPLR 308 in cases where personal delivery cannot be effected
upon the person to be served pursuant to a statute which is silent on
the method of service required.
ARTICLE 5 -VENUE

CPLR 506(b)(2): Express venue provision for comptroller held controlling in action with multiple defendants.
93 See CPLR 101.
94 See notes 85 and 86 supra and accompanying text.
95 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 03, commentary 44041 (1963).
9o CPLR 3011.
97 CPLR 2103(b).
98 Id.

